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Abstract
This paper studies the optimal income redistribution and monitoring when disability benefits are
intended for disabled people but where some able agents with high distastes for work mimic them
(type II errors). Labor supply responses are at the extensive margin and endogenous takeup
costs burden disabled recipients (due to a reputational externality caused by cheaters or due to
a snowball effect). Under a non-welfarist criterion which does not compensate for distaste for
work, (inactive) disabled recipients get a strictly lower consumption than disabled workers. The
usual conditions under which the optimal transfer program is a Negative Income Tax or an Earned
Income Tax Credit are challenged, due to monitoring. We also show that even if perfect monitoring
is costless, it is optimal to have type II errors. These results are robust to a utilitarian criterion.
Numerical simulations calibrated on US data are provided.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines the optimal redistributive structure and accuracy of monitoring when disabil-
ity benefits are intended for the disabled people but where some able agents with high distastes
for work mimic them. It characterizes the form of the optimal tax-transfer system when the
government operates a costly monitoring financed by labor income taxation.
The standard optimal taxation model assumes that individuals are distributed over some pri-
vate characteristic, such as productivity, the distribution of which is common knowledge. Redistri-
bution policy is limited by incentive constraints that must be satisfied if individuals are to reveal
their true productivity-types (Mirrlees, 1971). These incentive compatibility constraints are re-
laxed and redistribution enhanced when some characteristics correlated with low productivity (or
‘tag’ to use the terminology introduced by Akerlof, 1978), like the disability status, are monitored
for a subset of the disabled population.
This paper differs from the existing literature by endogenizing the monitoring technology
1
and
all the behavioral responses (participation to the labor market and to disability programs), which
allows to cast light on three important redistributive issues.
First: Who gets the largest consumption level? The tagging literature shows that tagged
disabled agents receive a larger consumption level than untagged disabled people.
2
This result
relies on the assumption that eligible people do not work whether they are tagged or untagged.
However, some disabled people work and others do not work and receive disability benefits, in the
real world. This paper models behavioral responses such as labor supply responses and takeup
responses as accurately as possible and shows that the optimal ranking of consumption bundles is
then reversed, due to an efficiency effect.
Second: Who gets the largest transfer? By definition, an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
provides the largest transfer to the disabled (or low-productivity) workers. On the contrary, with a
Negative Income Tax (NIT), the non-employed agents receive the largest transfer. As usual in the
1
An exception is Boadway et al. (1999) where the accuracy of monitoring depends on the effort level of social
workers. Boadway et al. (1999) characterize the optimal payment and monitoring of social workers who shirk.
Shirking induces errors when screening between disabled and low-ability claimants (the latter are the able in our
model). Contrastingly, the endogenous monitoring of our model depends upon the resources devoted to it and there
is no agency problem involved in the tagging process. We also relax Boadway et al.’s assumption that the government
policy is designed such that all low-ability and disabled people apply for welfare assistance. The other differences
between our model and that of Boadway et al. (1999) will become apparent as we proceed.
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See Akerlof (1978), Diamond and Sheshinski (1995), Parsons (1996) and Salanié (2002).
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literature, let us define the ratio of the social marginal utility to the marginal value of public funds
as the marginal social welfare weight. Neglecting monitoring, the literature has well established
that when labor supply responses are modeled along the extensive margin (i.e. the agent decides
to participate or not in the labor force), a marginal social welfare weight lower (larger) than one
on disabled workers implies a NIT (EITC) (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002). Contrastingly, this paper
shows that, with a costly monitoring technology, a marginal social welfare weight lower than one
on disabled workers does not preclude an EITC.
Third, relaxing the standard assumption that monitoring, and therefore the probability of
errors, is taken as given, this paper shows that there should always remain some type II errors (i.e.
able people who falsely claim to be disabled and receive disability benefits). When the marginal
cost of monitoring is very high, no monitoring (hence a type II error probability of one) is optimal.
More surprising, even when monitoring is perfect and costless, it is optimal that some type II
errors prevail, for efficiency reasons. It allows to give incentives to work to a subset of the disabled
as well as it avoids that all the able people mimic disabled workers.
In the paper, optimal tax formulas are derived providing a clear understanding of the key
economic effects underlying them. This allows to better emphasize the new effects that monitoring
and takeup imply on standard formulas. For easing the comparisons with the existing literature,
these formulas are presented as functions of the behavioral elasticities.
Non-taking up exists due to costs of learning about and applying for the program or due to
stigma costs (e.g., Sen, 1995; Currie, 2006). This paper emphasizes the endogenous stigma à la
Besley and Coate (1992) as an explanation of the non-takeup phenomenon. Due to the imperfect
observability of disability,
3
there are recipients whose decision to claim benefits can be directly
attributed to laziness and not to disability. When one is truly disabled, being considered as an
undeserving (i.e. lazy) recipient is demeaning and stigmatizing. This stigma increases with the
number of cheaters. No empirical papers have studied this endogenous stigma but anecdotal
evidence about people who cheat in welfare programs and then create doubts or social resentment
3
In 2005, about 80% of disability recipients suffer from mental disorders and musculoskeletal diseases (e.g., back
pain) (Social Security Administration, 2006). Most of these disabilities are generally neither easily observable nor
perfectly monitorable even with a deep medical examination (Campioleti, 2002). Therefore, disability transfer
systems are always imperfect. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b) estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who are
ultimately awarded benefits are not disabled. Moreover, some of those who are eligible for benefits will not take them
up. In EU countries, about 30% of people who report severe disability do not get disability benefits and therefore
work (Eurostat, 2001).
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against their peers, seems persistent enough to open the path to more investigations. To the best
of our knowledge, the endogenous stigma à la Besley and Coate has never been studied in the
optimal income tax and tagging literature. Moreover, this paper also studies the robustness of the
optimal tax formulas to an alternative takeup cost function.
The analysis is realized under a normative criterion corrected for features individuals are re-
sponsible for (Bossert et al., 1999; Schokkaert et al., 2004). According to this non-welfarist ap-
proach, income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work because individuals
are responsible for their own taste for work. And disabled workers, contrary to the lazy ones, ought
to be compensated for their handicap. The validity of our main results is examined and confirmed
under a utilitarian criterion.
We proceed in the following section by setting up the basic model. Assuming the non-welfarist
criterion, Sections 3 and 4 derive the optimal tax-transfer and monitoring programs under full
information and asymmetric information, respectively. Section 5 studies the robustness of the
results under a utilitarian criterion. Section 6 presents the main numerical simulations of optimal
tax and monitoring schemes (for which, details can be found in the Appendix).
2 The model
Productivities, disabilities and tastes for work
Individuals preferences are additively separable in consumption, labor and takeup costs and rep-
resented by:
u(x, ℓ, σ, φ, δ) = v(x)− δℓ− (1− ℓ)σI
where v is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in consumption x (which is
constrained to be nonnegative). ℓ is labor supply modeled on the extensive margin
4
i.e. ℓ ∈ {0, 1}.
δ is a parameter measuring disutility when working and σ denotes the (endogenous) takeup cost.
I is an indicator function that takes the value of 1 if inactive agents take up disability benefits and
0 otherwise. This paper follows Parsons (1996) and Salanié (2002) who point out that recipients
4
This assumption seems natural since the empirical literature has shown that the extensive margin of labor
responses is important especially at the low income end (Eissa and Liebman, 1996; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 2001)
while most estimates of hours of work elasticities conditional on working are small (Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999;
see also the discussion in Saez, 2002).
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of disability benefits are generally banned from working in the real world.
An agent is described by a set of exogenous characteristics, denoted by (w, δ
d
, δ
a
). The first
coordinate, w ∈ {w
L
, w
H
}, with w
H
> w
L
> 0, denotes his (low or high) productivity. As
usual in the optimal taxation literature, people are not responsible for w which is interpreted as
determined by their innate characteristics and their family background. δ
d
measures disutility
when working due to disability, i.e. the intensity of the physical or mental pain associated with
work due to disability if relevant (Harkness, 1993; Cuff, 2000; Marchand et al., 2003). The third
coordinate, δ
a
, is disutility when working due to distaste for work or work aversion (Laroque,
2005). Following Arneson (1990) and Roemer (1998), people are hold responsible for their taste
for work δ
a
while δ
d
stems from luck hence people are not responsible for it. These characteristics
are private information to each person; their distributions are public information. It is assumed
that δ
d
is distributed over the interval [0,∞), according to the cumulative distribution F(δ
d
) with
F
′
(δ
d
) = f(δ
d
), f(δ
d
) > 0 ∀δ ∈ [0,∞), F(∞) = 1. The work aversion δ
a
is distributed on the
interval [0,∞), according to the cumulative distribution G(δ
a
) with G
′
(δ
a
) = g(δ
a
), g(δ
a
) > 0
∀δ
a
∈ [0,∞) and G(∞) = 1.
When working, an agent produces a quantity w
L
or w
H
of an undifferentiated desirable com-
modity which can be reinterpreted as the gross labor earning in unskilled or skilled jobs respectively.
N
d
is the proportion of disabled people in the population. Their productivity is w
L
. N
a
≡ 1−N
d
is the proportion of able people in the population. Their productivity is w
H
. There is a perfect
correlation between disability and a lower productivity. This assumption is in the vein of the
statutory definition of disabled people who are eligible for disability benefits. The applicant is
considered to be disabled not just because of the existence of a medical impairment, but because
the impairment (drastically) reduces his productivity and precludes any substantial and gainful
work (Hu at al., 2001). A disabled worker in a wheelchair who has the functional capability to
engage in a substantial gainful job is not considered disabled neither by the U.S. Social Security
Act nor in this model. This model highlights the effects of errors in attributing disability benefits.
Therefore a clear boundary between eligible and non-eligible people is needed. This motivates
the assumption that disabled people do not suffer from distaste for work (δ
a
) such that all able
(disabled) people are unambiguously non-eligible (eligible) for disability benefits.
5
5
The parameter for disabled people could be disentangled in two components: δ = δ
a
+ δ
d
and again holding
4
Among its decision variables, the government has the after tax incomes which are denoted by
x
j
with j = l, h, b denoting net incomes respectively in unskilled jobs, in skilled jobs and when
receiving disability benefits hence non-participating in the labor force.
Reputational stigma
The definition of stigma adopted here follows Besley and Coate (1992) and the sociological litera-
ture on stigma since Goffman (1963). Stigma is viewed as resulting from a reputational externality.
Society is deemed to value certain individual characteristics such as willingness to earn one’s
income from work when one is able to do so (Elster, 1989; Sen, 1995; Lindbeck et al., 1999).
A social norm claiming that disabled low-productivity people should get transfers also prevails
(Romer, 1997; Wolff, 2004). Due to the imperfect observability of disability, there are recipients
whose decision to claim benefits can be directly attributed to laziness and not to disability. Stigma
prevails because taxpayers know (for instance, from media) that among the inactive people who
get disability benefits there are able people. These undeserving can generally not (perfectly)
be distinguished from the deserving, neither by the tax authority and nor by people in general.
Hence, undeserving individuals impose a “reputational externality” (Besley and Coate, 1992) on
the deserving ones. When it is known that an individual is receiving disability benefits, other
individuals will infer that this individual will likely be lazy. Stigma results then from statistical
discrimination. To be a disabled inactive recipient and considered as an undeserving (i.e. lazy)
recipient, when one truly is disabled is demeaning and stigmatizing. Disabled people who take up
transfers feel–and are– stigmatized, hence are burdened by a stigma disutility of σ ≥ 0.
6
Invoking the notion of stigma used by Besley and Coate (1992), it is assumed that the stigma
cost, σ(.), is an increasing function of the proportion of undeserving recipients in the economy,
7
denoted π
NW
a
. The undeserving beneficiaries are able and not working hence the subscript a and
people responsible for their taste parameter δ
a
, but not for their disability parameter δ
d
. However this complexifies
the model without bringing further analytical results.
6
Anecdotal evidence about this reputational stigma effect also exists in politics or sport. For instance, during
the 2006 Tour de France, when several exceptional cyclists were revealed to have taken drugs to improve their
performances, the entire profession lost its credibility and all cyclists became suspected of being cheaters.
7
For our qualitative results to be valid, all we really need is that there be a monotonic positive relationship
between π
NW
a
and the subjective number of undeserving recipients taxpayers inferred from media. Alternatively, we
may consider that the proportion of able people N
a
is common knowledge and that a statistic over people employed
in skilled jobs is also available. Therefore, by subtraction, every taxpayer can deduce the statistics about undeserving
recipients, π
NW
a
.
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the superscript NW are used. It is assumed that
σ
′
(π
NW
a
) > 0
The higher π
NW
a
is, the more people depreciate inactive recipients and the higher is stigma. It
seems realistic to assume that reputational stigma hurts deserving people more than undeserving
ones because the former face a limited choice set. The cost of being perceived as a cheater is lower
for someone who does commit fraud (i.e. an able recipient) than for someone who does not (i.e.
a disabled recipient). Without affecting the qualitative nature of the results but to later ease the
intuitions behind the optimal tax schedule, zero stigma effect for the able recipients is assumed.
However, the results are still valid when able people also face a positive stigma. Precisely how
much a person will feel stigmatized will also depend on individual specific characteristics, e.g. his
own self-esteem. To put the argument regarding the endogeneity of stigma and the impact of
monitoring in sharpest relief, we follow Besley and Coate (1992) and set aside this heterogeneity
of stigma costs, without discounting its importance.
Moreover, to fix σ(.) = 0 is equivalent to neglecting any takeup cost. Then, the endogenous
takeup depends on the tax-transfer schedule as usually assumed in the optimal tax and tagging
literature.
The definition of stigma presented above is relevant if we consider a society where people who
do their best abiding by the rules are respected and admired (even if they are quasi unproductive)
and where people who do not comply with the rules (even in a cunning way) are despised. If
we want to model a society where cheaters and old foxes are admired, the following definition of
stigmatization needs to be considered.
Takeup cost due to snowball effect
Even if the reputational stigma is largely documented in sociology, it could be interesting to
consider the case where the larger the population who unduly collect benefits, the lower the takeup
cost by deserving recipients, i.e.
σ
′
(
π
NW
a
)
< 0
and then, the larger the proportion of the deserving population who takes up. The takeup by
6
undeserving people plays like a snowball effect on the takeup by the deserving.
Rather than explaining the snowball effect with a society where cheaters and old foxes are
admired, an alternative empirical explanation can prevail. in the vein of recent empirical studies
that study endogenous social interactions and peer effects (a.o. Borjas and Hilton, 1996; Bertrand
et al., 2000; Aizer and Currie, 2004), it can become less embarrassing to live on transfers when
more individuals do likewise (Lindbeck et al., 1999). However, this effect is probably much more
difficult to justify with disability benefits than with unemployment or welfare benefits for instance.
Disability benefits do not seem to convey the same embarrassment of living on transfers as unem-
ployment benefits or welfare benefits because a social norm is that disabled people deserve benefits.
Unemployment and welfare benefits however have less legitimacy in societies where people are con-
vinced that effort is what principally accounts for how people do in life, and that those who are
poor simply have not tried hard enough (Rainwater, 1974; Alesina and Angeletos, 2005).
The phenomenon that disabled recipients are viewed with some suspicion and are vulnerable
to the accusations of laziness has largely been documented by psychologists and sociologists. To
the best of our knowledge, it has been largely neglected in economics and definitely deserves more
investigation. This motivates the focus of the rest of the paper on the reputational stigma à la
Besley and Coate (1992). However, the robustness of our results to a takeup cost due to snowball
can be checked. To ease this exercise, the necessary conditions of the optimal tax and monitoring
policy will be written with the general form σ
′
(
π
NW
a
)
.
The monitoring technology
A feature of disability systems is that the eligibility of applicants is assessed on the basis of
the disability status rather than being solely dependent on reported incomes. The process of
determining individual eligibility has been called ‘tagging’ by Akerlof (1978). In Akerlof (1978),
tagging allows to perfectly identify a given subset of disabled people. In this paper, it is assumed
that the accuracy of tagging is limited by a non-takeup phenomenon. Even if disabled people are
aware of their eligibility, part of them might not claim disability benefits depending on the level of
benefit and the associated stigma or takeup cost. Moreover, it is assumed that disability agencies
only imperfectly detect able claimants.
Differing from the existing literature (Stern, 1982; Diamond and Sheshisnki, 1995; Parsons,
1996), the monitoring (tagging) technology is not exogenous in this model. The accuracy of
7
monitoring depends on the per capita amount of resources,M, devoted to it. The higher isM, the
lower is the probability of type II error µ (“false positive”), i.e. the higher the precision with which
an able agent claiming disability benefits is detected. This model analyses the choice of monitoring
expenditures (M), which is equivalent to choosing the level of type II errors (µ). Formally, the
per capita cost of monitoring, M(µ), depends on the precision of the monitoring technology with
∂M/∂µ < 0, ∂
2
M/∂µ
2
 0, lim
µ→0
M(µ) = +∞ and M(1) = 0.
8
3 Full information
As a benchmark, a social planner’s solution where there is full observability of each individual’s
productivity and kind of labor disutility is considered. Under full information, the government
can use the individual information on δ and w to redistribute. The disability agencies have no
role to play, there is no monitoring and no type II error. Therefore, there is no stigma effect:
σ(π
NW
a
) = 0. The problem for the government is to determine two consumption functions χ(δ
d
, w
L
)
and χ(δ
a
, w
H
), i.e. a continuum of consumption bundles conditional on each productivity. The
government has also to assign people of both types of skill to work or inactivity, depending on
their δ
k
(k = d, a). Let D denote the set of the measurable subsets of [0,+∞). ∀δ
d
∈ D we have
ℓ (δ
d
) : D → {0, 1} such that ℓ (δ
d
) = 1 if all disabled with δ
d
in D are employed and ℓ (δ
d
) = 0 if
all disabled with δ
d
in D are inactive. ∀δ
a
∈ D we have ℓ (δ
a
) : D → {0, 1} such that ℓ (δ
a
) = 1
if all able with δ
a
in D are employed and ℓ (δ
a
) = 0 if all able with δ
a
in D are inactive. Since
the variable δ
k
(k = d, a) is continuously distributed, we need to work with functions defined over
measurable subsets of the domain. As a consequence
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
)dF (δ
d
), for instance, is the number
of disabled that are employed and do not take up disability benefits. Therefore, the problem for
the government can be rewritten as the choice of consumption functions x
j
(δ
k
, w
i
) with intensity
of labor disutility δ
k
(k = d, a), skills w
i
(i = L,H) and where j = l, h, b denotes the activity
respectively in unskilled jobs, in skilled jobs and when non-participating in the labor force. More
precisely, there are four consumption functions x
ℓ
(δ
d
, w
L
), x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
), x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
) and x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
).
9
8
In summary, disability agencies do not observe neither δ
d
nor δ
a
. They perfectly observe w
L
hence the disability
status of claimants (i.e. there is no type I error). However, they imperfectly observe w
H
such that type II errors
prevail.
9
In full information, since efficiency matters, it will never be optimal that able people work in unskilled jobs.
By putting these people in skilled jobs instead of unskilled jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase
someone’s consumption and hence his utility. Consequently, the consumption function x
ℓ
(δ
a
, w
H
) can be neglected.
8
The government budget constraint can then be formulated as follows:
N
d
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
d
) (w
L
− x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
))− (1− ℓ (δ
d
))x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
)] dF (δ
d
)
]
+N
a
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
a
) (w
H
− x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
))− (1− ℓ (δ
a
))x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
)]dG(δ
a
)
]
= −R
where R(≷ 0) is the exogenous revenue available to the economy.
The normative criterion is a sum (weighted by the share in the population) of utility functions
corrected for features individuals are responsible for. Implicit to this approach is the idea that
income should not be transferred as compensation for distaste for work (δ
a
) because individuals
are responsible for their own taste for work. And disabled workers contrary to the lazy ones ought
to be compensated for their handicap. We then use a paternalistic view for the valuation of labor
disutility by the normative criterion as in Bossert and Van de Gaer (1999) and Schokkaert et
al. (2004). The reference distaste for work (i.e. the weight attached by the government to the
distaste for work δ
a
of any individual) is equal to zero. The approach is clearly non-Paretian and
close to that used in behavioral economics when the social planner does not use, in its objective
function, individual preferences but its own preferences (O’ Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, Kanbur
et al., 2006). The normative criterion is
N
d
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
d
) (v (x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
))− δ
d
) + (1− ℓ (δ
d
)) v (x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
))]dF(δ
d
)
]
+N
a
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
a
) v (x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
)) + (1− ℓ (δ
a
)) v (x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
))]dG(δ
α
)
]
where the δ
a
distastes for work do not appear into the normative criterion.
Properties of the full-information optimum Under full information, all the agents receive
the same level of consumption (x), a Negative Income Tax is then optimal. All the able people
work while only disabled agents with δ
d
≤ v
′
(x)w
L
do work.
A formal proof is given in the Appendix and the intuition for this is as follows. Suppose all the
able individuals are working. The social benefit of having the able individuals with the highest
δ
a
to stop working is zero. The cost of having an able individual who stops working is w
H
(> 0).
Therefore, it is optimal that all able agents work. The same exercise can be done for the disabled
9
people. Suppose all the disabled individuals are working. The social benefit of having the disabled
people with the highest δ
d
to stop working is δ
d
∈ [0,∞) and the social cost is w
L
(> 0) which is
constant. Therefore, the choice of set of working disabled amounts to choosing a threshold value
̂
δ
a
such that those with δ
a
>
̂
δ
a
do not work and those with δ
a
≤
̂
δ
a
do work.
̂
δ
a
is such that the net
loss of utility when the marginal disabled individuals are shifted from the disability assistance to
the unskilled job is equal to the gain of resources (w
L
) valued according to their common marginal
utility, i.e.
̂
δ
d
= v
′
(x)w
L
with x denoting the consumption level. Consumption levels are the
same for all individuals (x) since the first-order conditions require identical marginal utility for
all individuals with additively separable utility functions. Therefore, the transfer (or tax) towards
the disabled workers, x − w
L
, is lower than the transfer to the inactive disabled, x. A Negative
Income Tax (NIT) is then optimal.
4 Asymmetric information
4.1 Results and derivation
Under asymmetric information, the tax authority is only able to observe income levels and thus
can condition taxation only on income. However, when monitoring is introduced disability agen-
cies have access to more information than the tax authority. The optimization problem for the
government takes place over three consumption bundles x
b
, x
l
, x
h
(doing so, it also assigns people
to work or inactivity)
10
and the optimal level of type II errors µ ∈ (0, 1].
The government needs to take into account the set of self-selection or incentive compatibility
constraints (hereafter ICC) in order to prevent individuals from a given type from taking the
tax-treatment designed for individuals of other types.
Since the objective function is increasing in individual’s consumption, it will never be optimal
that able people work in unskilled jobs. By putting these people in skilled jobs instead of unskilled
jobs, they produce more which can be used to increase someone’s consumption and hence his
10
In the literature on optimal redistributive taxation initiated by Mirrlees (1971), non-employment, if any, is
synonymous with non-participation. There is no job search hence people who do not work make the choice of being
inactive, i.e. there is no (so-called) involuntary unemployment. Similarly, there is no involuntary unemployment
in this model. However, disabled people face a real (physical or mental) pain at work they are not responsible for
hence they are eligible for disability benefits (x
b
).
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utility. Consequently, to induce able people to work in skilled jobs is always optimal hence:
x
h
≥ x
l
since the individual aversion to work δ
a
is the same in both jobs. A formal proof is given in the
Appendix. Therefore, no able individuals mimic disabled workers at the optimum. The remaining
incentive problem consists in able individuals who mimic disabled recipients.
Recall that with a probability µ, able individuals who claim disability benefits are accepted.
With a probability 1− µ, they are caught and therefore go back to work.
11
,
12
Able agents choose
either v(x
h
)−δ
a
or, with a probability µ, v(x
b
) and with a probability 1−µ, v(x
h
)− δ
a
. The ICC
on able agents states
v(x
h
)−
˜
δ
a
= µv(x
b
) + (1− µ)
[
v(x
h
)−
˜
δ
a
]
⇔
˜
δ
a
= v(x
h
)− v(x
b
) (1)
Equation (1) emphasizes that the decision of able people to apply or not for disability benefits does
not depend on the probability µ. The functions ℓ (δ
a
) then has the following shape: ℓ (δ
a
) = 1 for
all δ
a
≤
˜
δ
a
and ℓ (δ
a
) = 1 (ℓ (δ
a
) = 0) with a probability 1− µ (µ) for all δ
a
>
˜
δ
a
.
Disabled agents choose between v(x
l
)− δ
d
and v(x
b
)− σ
(
π
NW
a
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
))
. The function ℓ (δ
d
)
then has the following shape: ℓ (δ
d
) = 1 for all δ
d
≤
˜
δ
d
and zero otherwise. The ICC on disabled
states:
˜
δ
d
= v(x
l
)− v(x
b
)− σ
(
π
NW
a
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
))
(2)
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Having all detected able claimants who go back to work can be assumed or it can be shown that this is the
result of the optimal tax program where able agents who claim disability benefits and are detected choose either to
be inactive and to receive a (welfare) benefit T or to go back to work (then, they consume x
h
). Then, T = 0 is
optimal and all caught able claimants go back to work.
Proof. Assume lim
x→0
v(x) = −∞. Able agents choose either v(x
h
)− δ
a
or, with a probability µ, v(x
b
)− δ
a
and with
a probability 1− µ, Max {v(x
h
)− δ
a
, v(T )}. The ICC on able agents states
v(x
h
)−
˜
δ
a
= µv(x
b
) + (1− µ)
[
Max
{
v(x
h
)−
˜
δ
a
, v(T )
}]
Since −δ
a
is not valued by the welfare function and because efficiency matters, ∀δ
a
∈ [0,∞), it is optimal that
v(x
h
)− δ
a
≥ v(T). Therefore, since x
h
> 0, the maximum penalty T = 0 is optimal and all caught able people go
back to work. Therefore, the ICC on able people can be written as (1).
12
Boadway and Cuff (1999) distinguish between voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed. In their model, when
the government perfectly identifies the voluntary unemployed, the maximum penalty of zero consumption is assumed.
In this model, the maximum penalty to the voluntary inactive able people (see footnote 11) implies that they go
back to work.
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with π
NW
a
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
= N
a
µ
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
, the share of population which is able and unduly collect
disability benefits.
Recall that the stigma function satisfies σ
′
(π
NW
a
) > 0. Moreover, σ → 0 if either
˜
δ
a
→ 0 or
µ→ 0. For instance, the stigma function can be a linear function of π
NW
a
as
σ
(
π
NW
a
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
))
= sπ
NW
a
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
with s > 0 (3)
where s is the marginal disutility of stigma, σ
′
(π
NW
a
).
From (1) and the definition of π
NW
a
:
∂σ
∂x
b
= −
∂σ
∂π
NW
a
∂π
NW
a
∂
˜
δ
a
v
′
(x
b
) = σ
′
(π
NW
a
)N
a
µg
(
˜
δ
a
)
v
′
(x
b
) > 0 (4)
Combining these results with (2), and totally differentiating gives:
∂
˜
δ
d
∂x
b
= −v
′
(x
b
)
(
1 +
∂σ
∂
˜
δ
a
)
If one wanted to guarantee that ∂
˜
δ
d
/∂x
b
< 0
13
, one would need to assume that, at the optimum:
∂σ
∂π
NW
a
<
1
N
a
µg
(
˜
δ
a
)
(5)
i.e. an upper bound on the marginal disutility of stigma.
The reader more interested in the snowball takeup cost can alternatively consider σ
′
(π
NW
a
) < 0
and assume that σ(π
NW
a
) reaches its minimum value if either
˜
δ
a
→ 0 or µ→ 1.
Lemma 1 Active and inactive people in both ability groups co-exist, under asymmetric informa-
tion (i.e. ∞ >
˜
δ
d
> 0 and ∞ >
˜
δ
a
> 0).
Proof. (1) Both
˜
δ
a
and
˜
δ
d
are smaller than ∞. As ∀δ
a
: g(δ
a
) > 0 (∀δ
d
: f(δ
d
) > 0), all able
(disabled) people work means
˜
δ
a
→∞ (
˜
δ
d
→∞) at the optimum. Since consumption levels (and
stigma) are finite, from (1) and ((2)),
˜
δ
a
and
˜
δ
d
cannot tend to ∞.
13
Following an increase in x
b
, the global effect on
˜
δ
d
can be decomposed into a positive direct effect and a negative
indirect effect. The increase in the proportion of disabled people claiming assistance (or equivalently the diminishing
in the level of
˜
δ
d
) is the direct effect. The indirect effect stems from the enlargement of stigma that follows the fall
in
˜
δ
a
which in turn leads to a decrease in the proportion of disabled recipients (or equivalently to an increase in
˜
δ
d
).
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(2) If no-one works i.e.
˜
δ
a
=
˜
δ
d
= 0, it is optimal for everyone to have the same consumption
: x
l
= x
h
= x
b
= R
′
with R
′
def
≡ Max {0,R}. This allocation will not be optimal if those with
the least handicap, δ
d
(the least disutility of work, δ
a
) were to choose to work for the additional
consumption equal to their marginal product. It will be the case because: v(R
′
+ w
L
) > v(R
′
)
(v(R
′
+ w
H
) > v(R
′
)). This implies that
˜
δ
d
> 0 (
˜
δ
a
> 0) at the optimum. More generally, for all
planners with an objective function that is increasing in individual utilities, making some disabled
work is optimal.
From (1) and
˜
δ
a
> 0, we know:
x
h
> x
b
The government budget constraint becomes
π
W
d
(w
L
− x
l
)−
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
x
b
+ π
W
a
(w
H
− x
h
)−
(
π
NW
d
+
π
NW
a
µ
)
M(µ) = −R (6)
where π
W
d
is the share of population which is disabled and work, π
NW
d
is the share of population
which is disabled and receive disability benefits, π
NW
a
is the share of population which is able
and unduly collect disability benefits, π
W
a
is the share of population which is able and work (it
includes the refused undeserving claimants). Table 1 displays the proportions of individuals in each
position. The per capita cost of monitoring M(µ) appears ex ante and for any individual who has
applied for welfare, i.e. for the proportion N
d
(
1− F
(
˜
δ
d
))
+N
a
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
= π
NW
d
+π
NW
a
/µ.
Thus, the total cost of monitoring is increasing in the proportion of monitored individuals.
recipients of disa-
bility benefits
workers
disabled (w
l
, δ
d
) π
NW
d
= N
d
(1−F (
˜
δ
d
)) π
W
d
= N
d
F(
˜
δ
d
)
able (w
h
, δ
a
) π
NW
a
= N
a
µ
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
π
W
a
= N
a
[
G
(
˜
δ
a
)
+(1− µ)
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))]
Table 1: Distribution of individuals in the population
There is an interesting approach in the optimal income tax literature where the optimal tax
schedule is rewritten as expressions of the labor supply elasticities (Saez (2001), Saez (2002)). This
paper will also state the first-order conditions involving the elasticities of participation. This will
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allow a straightforward comparison, emphasizing how the standard formulas are affected when
monitoring costs and stigma are considered. Let us then define the elasticity of participation of
the disabled workers with respect to x
l
as
η
(
x
l
,
˜
δ
d
)
def
≡
x
l
π
W
d
∂π
W
d
∂x
l
(7)
where ∂π
W
d
/∂x
l
= N
d
f
(
˜
δ
d
)
v
′
(x
l
) from (2). And the elasticity of participation of the able workers
with respect to x
h
as
η
(
x
h
,
˜
δ
a
)
def
≡
x
h
π
W
a
∂π
W
a
∂x
h
(8)
where ∂π
W
a
/∂x
h
= N
a
µg
(
˜
δ
a
)
v
′
(x
h
) from (1). These elasticities measure the percentage number
of disabled (able) workers in unskilled (skilled) job who decide to leave the labor force when x
l
(x
h
) decreases by 1 percent.
Next, we define the marginal social welfare weight for working agents whose consumption is
x
l
and x
h
, respectively as the ratio of the social marginal utility of consumption and the shadow
price of the public funds:
g
l
def
≡
v
′
(x
l
)
λ
(9)
g
h
def
≡
v
′
(x
h
)
λ
(10)
Disabled individuals are not responsible for the stigmatization (or snowball) phenomenon. One
can then argue that they are not responsible for the impact of σ on their well-being. Therefore,
there are good reasons to integrate it in the non-welfarist objective function. The Lagrangian
states as
£ = N
d
[
∫
˜
δ
d
0
(v (x
l
)− δ
d
)dF (δ
d
) +
(
1− F
(
˜
δ
d
))(
v (x
b
)− σ
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
))
]
+ π
W
a
v(x
h
)
+π
NW
a
v(x
b
) + λ
[
π
W
d
(w
L
− x
l
)−
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
x
b
+ π
W
a
(w
H
− x
h
)
−
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
/µ
)
M(µ) +R
]
where
˜
δ
a
(
˜
δ
d
) is given by (1) ((2)).
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Proposition 1 Under asymmetric information, the optimal levels of consumption and type II
errors have to satisfy the budget constraint (6) and the following four equations:
x
l
−w
L
− x
b
−M(µ)
x
l
=
1
η
(
x
l
,
˜
δ
d
)
(g
l
− 1) (11)
x
h
−w
H
− x
b
−
M(µ)
µ
x
h
=
1
η
(
x
h
,
˜
δ
a
)
[
(g
h
− 1) +
S (x
h
, x
l
, x
b
, µ)
π
W
a
]
+
˜
δ
a
λx
h
(12)
where S (x
h
, x
l
, x
b
, µ) = (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
h
−
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂x
h
states for the indirect behavioral
reponses and indirect welfare change which arise from the endogenous stigma,
1
λ
=
π
W
d
v
′
(x
l
)
+
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
v
′
(x
b
)
+
π
W
a
v
′
(x
h
)
(13)
and
(1− µ)
∂£
∂µ
= 0 and
∂£
∂µ
≥ 0 (14)
where ∂£/∂µ is given by (18) below.
The proof is given below as well as a simple heuristic interpretation in the spirit of Saez (2002)
that illuminates the economics behind these necessary conditions. Moreover, it is straightforward
to see the following characteristics of the optimum.
Substituting M(µ) = 0 in (11), it yields the standard optimal tax schedule with extensive
responses (Diamond, 1980; Saez, 2002). The financial incentive to enter the labor force, i.e. the
difference between the transfer (or tax) to disabled workers (x
l
− w
L
) and the transfer to the
non-employed people (x
b
), is inversely related to the participation elasticity η
(
x
l
,
˜
δ
d
)
in the vein
of the inverse elasticity rule of Ramsey. Similarly, the financial incentives to enter the labor force
increases with the marginal social welfare weight of (disabled) workers (g
l
). When monitoring costs
are included (i.e. M(µ) > 0), η
(
x
l
,
˜
δ
d
)
and g
l
determine the difference between the transfer (or
tax) towards disabled workers (x
l
−w
L
) and the total cost of a transfer towards disabled recipients
(x
b
+M(µ)).
14
Proposition 3 will discuss the differences between our formula and the one of Saez
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From (11), an optimal replacement rate formula can also be derived as done in Kroft (2008). It implies to follow
Kroft’s assumption of zero taxation in unskilled jobs, i.e. x
l
= w
L
, to neglect monitoring costs and to define the
elasticity of participation by
[
(x
l
− x
b
)/π
W
d
] (
∂π
W
d
/∂x
l
)
. Then it can easily be shown that (11) becomes an optimal
15
(2002) in deeper details.
Compared to (11), the optimal formula (12) has two key changes due to the stigma externality
and the non-welfarist criterion. S (x
h
, x
l
, x
b
, µ) includes all the effects due to the stigma externality.
The term
˜
δ
a
/ (λx
h
) is due to the fact that the marginal disutility
˜
δ
a
is not included into the non-
welfarist criterion. This term appears since the effect of an infinitesimal change in the consumption
bundle of able workers induces the marginal able agents to start working, which has a first order
effect on the non-welfarist evaluation of their well-being equal to v(x
h
)− v(x
b
), which by virtue of
(1) reduces to
˜
δ
a
. The denominator in (12) converts this effect in terms of public funds and makes
it relative to x
h
. This term is sometimes called the paternalistic or first-best motive for taxation
since it arises from differences between social and private preferences (Kanbur et al., 2006).
15
It
corrects the labor supply of able people to (better) correspond to social preferences.
Equation (13) is similar to Diamond and Sheshinski (1995)’s equation (6), p.6 and, without
income effects on labor supply to Saez (2002)’s equation (2), p.1047. It gives an important redis-
tributive principle of the optimal redistributive programs, which prevails independently of stigma
effects. At the optimum, the inverse of the marginal cost of public funds is equal to the average of
the inverses of the marginal utilities of consumption of each individual in each group, the weights
being the shares in the population.
16
Multiplying both sides of (13) by λ, this principle can be
rephrased as: the average (using population proportions) value of the inverses of the marginal
welfare weights is one.
Proof and heuristic interpretation of Proposition 1
First-order condition with respect to x
l
, (11)
From the Lagrangian, the first-order condition with respect to x
l
gives
π
W
d
(
v
′
(x
l
)
λ
− 1
)
= − (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
l
(15)
Using (7) and (9), this necessary condition can be rewritten as (11).
replacement rate formula as a function of the elasticity of participation.
15
˜
δ
a
> 0 (Lemma 1) hence
˜
δ
a
is always larger than the reference distaste for work.
16
It can easily been checked that at the optimum, the inverse of the marginal cost of the public funds is, more
generally, equal to the average of the inverse (individual) marginal utilities of consumption, divided by the social
marginal utility of (individual) utilities. The latter equals one for the non-welfarist planner and the utilitarian one
(that we will study in Section 5).
16
A simple heuristic interpretation in the spirit of Saez (2002) follows. Consider a small increase
of the consumption x
l
(i.e. a small reduction of the income tax in unskilled jobs), around the
optimal tax schedule. There are a mechanical effect and a behavioral (or labor supply response)
effect.
Mechanical effect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to −π
W
d
dx
l
because disabled workers have dx
l
additional consumption. This mechanically increases social welfare of disabled workers by their
marginal social welfare weight v
′
(x
l
)/λ (≡ g
l
).
17
Thus the mechanical welfare gain (expressed in
terms of the value of public funds) due to dx
l
is equal to (v
′
(x
l
)/λ) π
W
d
dx
l
. Therefore, the total
mechanical effect is π
W
d
(v
′
(x
l
)/λ− 1) dx
l
.
Behavioral effect
Behavioral (or labor supply) responses imply a gain in tax revenue. The change dx
l
> 0 induces
∂π
W
d
/∂x
l
(pivotal) disabled workers to enter the labor force. Each worker leaving disability as-
sistance induces a gain in government revenue equal to w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ). That is the tax
paid by a disabled worker (w
L
− x
l
) plus the benefit that was paid to her as a disabled recipient
(x
b
) as well as the associated cost of monitoring (M(µ)). The total behavioral gain is equal to
(w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
(
∂π
W
d
/∂x
l
)
dx
l
.
At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical and behavioral effects equal zero and gives (15).
First-order condition with respect to x
h
, (12)
Consider a small change dx
h
> 0. This change implies mechanical and behavioral effects on
government revenue and welfare.
Mechanical effect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to −π
W
a
dx
h
because able workers consume an
additional dx
h
. This mechanical decrease in tax revenue, however, is valued (v
′
(x
h
)/λ− 1)π
W
a
dx
h
by the government since each euro not raised increases the consumption of able workers and this
consumption gain is socially valued v
′
(x
h
)/λ (≡ g
h
) in terms of public funds.
17
Intuitively, the non-welfarist government is indifferent between g
l
more euro of public funds and one more euro
consumed by the disabled workers.
17
Behavioral effect
There are two effects (a direct one and an indirect one) on government revenue due to behavioral
responses following dx
h
> 0.
(1) A direct behavioral response comes from ∂π
W
a
/∂x
h
(pivotal) previously inactive able agents
who enter the labor force. Each recipient entering the labor force induces a gain in tax revenue of
w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
, i.e. the tax paid by each new able worker (w
H
− x
h
) and the benefit that stops to
be paid to her. There is also a gain in monitoring expenditures (M(µ)) for the (∂N
a
G
(
˜
δ
a
)
/∂x
h
)
able people who stop applying for disability benefits. The gain of government expenditures is
then (w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+M(µ)/µ)
(
∂π
W
a
/∂x
h
)
dx
h
. The change dx
h
also induces a welfare gain since
there are ∂π
W
a
/∂x
h
new pivotal workers whose aversion to work
˜
δ
a
is not valued into the welfare
function. Valued in terms of public funds, this welfare gain is
(
˜
δ
a
/λ
)
(
∂π
W
a
/∂x
h
)
dx
h
.
(2) The previous direct behavioral effect implies an externality effect through the change in
the stigma disutility: the change dx
h
indirectly induces ∂π
W
d
/∂x
h
pivotal disabled recipients to
change their occupational choice due to stigma effects. Using the envelope theorem and (1) and
(2), ∂π
W
d
/∂x
h
> 0 (< 0) if ∂σ/∂
˜
δ
a
> 0 (< 0). Each disabled recipient entering the labor force
induces a revenue gain of w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ) for the government. Hence the total gain is
(w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
(
∂π
W
d
/∂x
h
)
dx
h
. The change dx
h
also affects welfare through a change in
the stigma intensity of the π
NW
d
disabled recipients. This change in terms of public funds is valued
−π
NW
d
(∂σ/∂x
h
/λ)dx
h
by the government. Then, all the indirect effects implied by the stigma
externality when dx
h
> 0 are denoted by S (x
h
, x
l
, x
b
, µ) defined in Proposition 1.
At the optimum, the sum of the mechanical and all the behavioral effects has to be nil which
gives
π
W
a
(
v
′
(x
h
)
λ
− 1
)
−
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂x
h
+
˜
δ
a
λ
∂π
W
a
∂x
h
= (16)
−
(
w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+
M(µ)
µ
)
∂π
W
a
∂x
h
− (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
h
Using (8) and (10) the latter equation can be rewritten as (12).
A necessary condition on the marginal cost of public funds λ, (13)
The necessary condition (13) comes from equations (11), (12) and the necessary condition with
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respect to x
b
that can be stated as
(
π
NW
a
+ π
NW
d
)
(
v
′
(x
b
)
λ
− 1
)
−
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂x
b
+
˜
δ
a
λ
∂π
W
a
∂x
b
= (17)
= −
(
w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+
M(µ)
µ
)
∂π
W
a
∂x
b
− (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
b
Dividing (15), (16) and (17) by v
′
(x
l
), v
′
(x
h
), v
′
(x
b
) respectively, and adding these equations gives
(13).
The first-order condition with respect to x
b
could be substituted to equation (13) to characterize
the optimum in the above Proposition. Details about this alternative equation can be found in
Appendix C.
First-order condition with respect to µ, (14)
∂$
∂µ
≥ 0 from (14) can be rewritten as
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂µ
+
π
NW
a
µ
˜
δ
a
λ
≤ (18)
∂π
W
d
∂µ
(w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))−
π
NW
a
µ
(w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
)−
(
π
NW
d
+
π
NW
a
µ
)
∂M(µ)
∂µ
dµ > 0 implies the following mechanical and behavioral effects on government revenue and
welfare.
Mechanical effect
There is a mechanical gain in monitoring expenditures equal to
−
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
/µ
)
(∂M(µ)/∂µ)dµ
because the per capita cost on the
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
/µ
)
people who are monitored is reduced (∂M(µ)/∂µ <
0).
Behavioral effect
There are two effects on government revenue due to behavioral responses.
(1) There is a loss in tax revenue equal to−(w
H
−x
h
+x
b
)N
a
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
dµ withN
a
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
≡
π
NW
a
/µ, due to additional able people receiving disability benefits rather than working. This in-
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duces a welfare loss due to the reduction of workers whose disutility
˜
δ
a
was not valued into the
non-welfarist criterion hence who imply a welfare gain. This welfare loss expressed in public funds
is −
(
˜
δ
a
/λ
)
(
π
NW
a
/µ
)
dµ.
(2) Through stigma effects, dµ > 0 induces ∂π
W
d
/∂µ > 0 (< 0) disabled agents to enter (leave)
the labor force when ∂σ/∂µ > 0 (∂σ/∂µ < 0). Each disabled recipient entering the labor force
induces a gain in tax revenue of w
L
−x
l
+x
b
as well as a gain in monitoring cost ofM(µ). In total,
this indirect behavioral gain is (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
(
∂π
W
d
/∂µ
)
dµ. The change dµ also affects
welfare through a change in the stigma intensity of the π
NW
d
disabled recipients. This change in
terms of public funds is valued −π
NW
d
(∂σ/∂µ/λ)dµ by the government.
In case of an interior solution (µ < 1), the optimal amount of monitoring is such the impact
of a small increase of the probability of type II errors dµ > 0 cancels out the mechanical and
behavioral effects such that (18) takes the equal sign.
When the marginal cost of monitoring |∂M/∂µ| is not huge, monitoring is always optimal
(i.e. µ < 1) because it reduces the number of undeserving recipients thereby improves efficiency
and also reduces stigmatization (with ∂σ/∂µ > 0). However, when |∂M/∂µ| is very high, the
right-hand side of (18) can become strictly higher than the left-hand side and therefore, from (14),
µ = 1 prevails at the optimum. No monitoring is optimal, whoever applies for disability benefits is
granted them. From simulations calibrated using US data, Appendix D gives the threshold level
of per capita cost of monitoring beyond which monitoring becomes suboptimal (i.e. µ = 1).
Proposition 2 Consumption of workers in low-productivity jobs is strictly larger than the disabil-
ity benefit, x
l
> x
b
. It cannot be ruled out that workers in unskilled jobs pay taxes.
Proof. From
˜
δ
d
> 0 and
˜
δ
a
> 0 (see Lemma 1) and (13) two rankings can prevail at the
optimum: either
1
v
′
(x
h
)

1
v
′
(x
l
)
>
1
v
′
(x
b
)
⇔ x
h
 x
l
> x
b
or (19)
1
v
′
(x
h
)
>
1
v
′
(x
b
)

1
v
′
(x
l
)
⇔ x
h
> x
b
 x
l
(20)
In both cases, (19) and (20), v
′
(x
h
) < λ. Moreover, if (19) prevails, we have: v
′
(x
b
) > λ and if (20)
is correct then: v
′
(x
l
) > λ. However v
′
(x
l
) > λ implies that the left-hand side of (11) is positive.
This requires that w
L
−x
l
+x
b
+M(µ) < 0⇔ x
l
−x
b
> w
L
+M(µ) > 0, which contradicts x
b
 x
l
.
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The sign of w
L
− x
l
is ambiguous since the budget constraint (6) can be rewritten as:
w
L
− x
l
=
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
w
L
+
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
(x
l
− x
b
) + π
W
a
(w
L
− w
H
)
+π
W
a
(x
h
− x
l
) +
(
π
NW
d
+
π
NW
a
µ
)
M(µ)−R
where in the right-hand side, two terms are negative: π
W
a
(w
L
−w
H
) and
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
(x
l
− x
b
)
and the other terms are positive except −R which can take both signs. Hence, the gross income
of disabled workers can be increased (in case of a transfer: w
L
− x
l
< 0) or decreased (in case of a
tax: w
L
− x
l
> 0) by the optimal tax-transfer system.
The result x
l
> x
b
can seem counter-intuitive at first sight for two reasons. First, those who
get the lowest consumption are also those who suffer from stigma. Second, it is well known from
the tagging literature that tagged disabled people get a larger consumption than untagged ones,
i.e. x
l
> x
b
(e.g., Parsons, 1996; Salanié, 2002). In this literature, tagging allows to improve equity
since some of the needy get higher transfers. At the same time, tagging also improves efficiency
by circumventing the incentive constraints that normally limit the extent of redistribution. In our
model, tagging also circumvents the incentive constraints but giving financial incentives to work
up to the point that x
l
becomes strictly larger than x
b
improves efficiency further. In standard
tagging models, since disabled are by assumption always inactive, no efficiency effect will push the
consumption of untagged disabled above the one of tagged disabled.
The next question to address is: which individuals will the government want to redistribute
more? Since the early work of Diamond (1980), it is known that in the extensive model, under
asymmetric information, it may be worthwhile to implement a NIT or to subsidize work using the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). The latter consists in providing a transfer larger to unskilled
workers than to inactive people.
With labor supply modeled along the extensive margin, Saez (2002) shows that comparing the
value of the marginal social welfare of workers with low productivity (i.e. of disabled workers in
our context) and the marginal cost of public funds allows to conclude about the optimality of an
EITC versus a NIT. In particular, without income effects on labor supply, Saez (2002) shows that
an EITC prevails when the marginal social welfare of workers with low productivity is larger than
the marginal cost of public funds (i.e. v
′
(x
l
)/λ ≡ g
l
≥ 1). (Saez, 2002, pp.1048-50). The following
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proposition emphasizes that this result is robust to the introduction of income effects and to the
introduction of costly monitoring. Saez (2002) also derives that a necessary and sufficient condition
for having a NIT at the optimum is g
l
< 1 (Saez (2002), Proposition 1). The following proposition
points out the robustness of this result to the introduction of costless monitoring. However, it is
shown that g
l
< 1 is not sufficient for advocating a NIT as soon as costly monitoring is considered.
It can then be argued that costly monitoring plays in favor of an EITC.
Proposition 3 When costless monitoring is assumed, an EITC (a NIT) is optimal when g
l
≥ 1
(g
l
< 1), in the vein of Saez (2002). With costly monitoring, g
l
≥ 1 implies an EITC and the
EITC result can also carry through with g
l
< 1.
Proof. From (11), g
l
≥ 1⇔ x
l
−w
L
≥ x
b
+M(µ). Disabled workers receive a transfer (x
l
−w
L
)
that is larger than the transfer towards disabled recipients (x
b
), i.e. an EITC is optimal. This
result prevails with M(µ) ≥ 0.
From (11), g
l
< 1 ⇔ x
l
− w
L
< x
b
+M(µ). When M(µ) = 0 : x
b
> x
l
− w
L
, i.e. a NIT
is optimal. When M(µ) > 0 (i.e. µ < 1) the previous inequality does not imply x
b
> x
l
− w
L
anymore.
The question addressed in the next proposition is: Should perfect monitoring be used when its
implementation is costless? Proposition 4 will emphasize that even if monitoring is costless and
could be perfect, some type II errors do prevail at the optimum. In other words, when perfect
monitoring can be realized without any governmental spending, it is however not optimal to use
it.
Proposition 4 With costless monitoring, perfect monitoring (i.e. µ = 0) is not optimal (with or
without stigma).
Proof. By contradiction, assume µ = 0. We then have σ(.) = 0 and π
W
a
= N
a
. The first-order
condition with respect to x
h
, (16), becomes:
N
a
(
v
′
(x
h
)
λ
− 1
)
= 0
Therefore v
′
(x
h
) = λ when µ = 0. This implies that (13) (which is still valid with costless
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monitoring) becomes:
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1−N
a
v
′
(x
h
)
=
π
W
d
v
′
(x
l
)
+
π
NW
d
v
′
(x
b
)
(21)
Since a weighted average with positive weights is bounded by its least and greatest elements, and
since x
l
> x
b
(from (2)):
1
v
′
(x
l
)
≥
1
v
′
(x
h
)
≥
1
v
′
(x
b
)
with at least a strict inequality. From the first
inequality: x
l
≥ x
h
. However x
l
> x
h
does not prevail at the optimum (otherwise all caught able
would work in unskilled jobs, which is inefficient) hence x
l
= x
h
. Substitute the latter into (21)
gives v
′
(x
l
) = v
′
(x
b
) (since 1−N
a
= π
W
d
+ π
NW
d
). This contradicts x
l
> x
b
. Therefore µ > 0.
Intuitively, costless and perfect monitoring means that the government can identify able and
disabled perfectly (it perfectly observes their productivity levels) at zero cost if they apply for
disability benefits. All able people would then be indifferent between applying and not applying
since they would never obtain the disability benefits. All able people would work and stigma
would then be nil. However, a perfect monitoring is more costly for the government than allowing
some type II errors: No type II errors would prevent to give incentives to work to a subset of the
disabled as well as it would imply that all the able workers mimic disabled workers.
5 Utilitarian criterion
We now consider a utilitarian social welfare function (SWF), i.e. a sum of utilities weighted by
the share in the population. The only differences with the non-welfarist criterion is (i) the terms
v (x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
)) which are substituted by v (x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
))− δ
a
in the Lagrangian function, under full
information, (ii) the terms v (x
h
) which are substituted by v(x
h
)− δ
a
in the Lagrangian function,
under asymmetric information.
18
Proof. When µ = 0, (15) becomes
π
W
d
(
v
′
(x
l
)
λ
− 1
)
= − (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
)
∂π
W
d
∂x
l
= − (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
)N
d
f
(
˜
δ
d
)
v
′
(x
l
)
and (17) becomes:
π
NW
d
(
v
′
(x
b
)
λ
− 1
)
= − (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
)
∂π
W
d
∂
˜
δ
d
∂
˜
δ
d
∂x
b
= (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
)N
d
f
(
˜
δ
d
)
v
′
(x
b
)
Dividing these two equations by v
′
(x
l
) and v
′
(x
b
) respectively, and adding them gives
π
W
d
+ π
NW
d
λ
=
π
W
d
v
′
(x
l
)
+
π
NW
d
v
′
(x
b
)
Substituting λ = v
′
(x
h
) into the latter gives (21).
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It can be seen as contradictory to use a utilitarian criterion and a costly monitoring technology:
One screens people with high distaste for work, δ
a
, on the one hand, and compensates for distaste
for work, δ
a
, by including δ
a
in the utilitarian SWF, on the other hand. However, this is the
objective function generally used in the tagging literature.
Full information
Under full information, it is optimal to have able people who do not work and receive disability
benefits, for a utilitarian social planner. This result contrasts with the full information optimum
under a non-welfarist criterion.
Proof. It is easy to see that the same first order conditions as with the non-welfarist objective
are obtained, and so the solution is given by (24). From the budget constraint, we then have (25).
Substituting (25) in the value of the objective function, gives the value of utilitarian social welfare
as a function of the ℓ (δ
d
) and ℓ (δ
a
) functions:
v
(
N
d
w
L
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
)dF (δ
d
) +N
a
w
H
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
a
)dG (δ
α
) +R
)
−N
d
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
) δ
d
dF (δ
d
)−N
a
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
a
) δ
a
dF(δ
a
)
Keeping the number of employed of both types fixed, it is only though the terms on the last
line that the shape of the ℓ (δ
d
) and ℓ (δ
a
) functions matter for a utilitarian planner. Hence, as δ
k
(k = d, a) rises from 0 to ∞ the function ℓ (δ
k
) δ
k
, where ℓ (δ
k
) = 1 ∀δ
k
, goes from 0 to ∞. For a
utilitarian social planner, it is always optimal to have those in work with the lowest δ
k
(k = d, a).
Therefore the functions δ
L
(α) and δ
H
(α) have the following shape: ℓ (δ
d
) = 1 for all δ
d
≤
̂
δ
d
otherwise zero and ℓ (δ
a
) = 1 for all δ
a
≤
̂
δ
a
otherwise zero. The critical values are
̂
δ
k
= v
′
(x)w
j
> 0 (k, j) = (d, L), (a,H)
Differing from the optimum under a non-welfarist criterion, since v
′
(x) and w
H
are finite we now
have
̂
δ
a
<∞ i.e. there are able agents who do not work and receive benefits.
Note that from w
H
> w
L
,
̂
δ
a
>
̂
δ
d
= v
′
(x)w
L
as under the non-welfarist criterion.
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Asymmetric information
Proposition 5 Under asymmetric information, qualitative properties highlighted with the non-
welfarist criterion (i.e. Propositions 2-4) are also valid under the utilitarian criterion.
Proof. The Lagrangian states as
£ = N
d
[
∫
˜
δ
d
0
(v (x
l
)− δ
d
)dF (δ
d
) +
(
1−F
(
˜
δ
d
))(
v (x
b
)− σ
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
))
]
+N
a
[
(
G
(
˜
δ
a
)
+ (1− µ)
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
)))
v (x
h
)−
∫
˜
δ
a
0
δ
a
dG(δ
a
)
− (1− µ)
∫
∞
˜
δ
a
δ
a
dG(δ
a
) + µ
(
1−G
(
˜
δ
a
))
v(x
b
)
]
+λ
{
π
W
d
(w
L
− x
l
)−
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
x
b
+ π
W
a
(w
H
− x
h
)−
(
π
NW
d
+
π
NW
a
µ
)
M(µ) +R
}
The first-order conditions are the resource constraint (6), the first-order conditions with respect
to x
l
(11), with respect to µ (i.e. (14) and (18)), equation (13) and the necessary condition with
respect to x
h
which can be stated as:
π
W
a
(
v
′
(x
h
)
λ
− 1
)
−
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂x
h
= (22)
−
(
w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+
M(µ)
µ
)
∂π
W
a
∂x
h
− (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
h
or which, using (8), can be rewritten as:
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x
h
− w
H
− x
b
−
M(µ)
µ
x
h
=
1
η
(
x
h
,
˜
δ
a
)
[
(g
h
− 1) +
S (x
h
, x
l
, x
b
, µ)
π
W
a
]
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 are still valid since their proofs exclusively depend on (13) which can
be shown to be still valid with a utilitarian criterion. The proof is straightforward. Equation
(13) is obtained from the first-order conditions with respect to x
l
and x
h
and from the first-order
19
There is no more change in welfare (directly) due to the behavioral response of the marginal able workers leaving
the labor force, characterized by δ
a
=
˜
δ
a
. On the margin these individuals are indifferent between receiving disability
benefits and working (see equation (1)). Their well-being weight is now the same in the SWF, whether they are
recipients or workers, which was not the case under the non-welfarist criterion.
25
condition with respect to x
b
, i.e.:
(
π
NW
a
+ π
NW
d
)
(
v
′
(x
b
)
λ
− 1
)
−
π
NW
d
λ
∂σ
∂x
b
= (23)
= −
(
w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+
M(µ)
µ
)
∂π
W
a
∂x
b
− (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
∂π
W
d
∂x
b
Dividing (15), (22) and (23) by v
′
(x
l
), v
′
(x
h
), v
′
(x
b
) respectively, and adding them implies (13).
The qualitative nature of the social optimum under both criteria is identical since they both take
a weighted additively separable form. But this does not mean that the optima are quantitatively
identical as shown in Section 6.
6 An illustration
Appendix D illustrates our model by calibrating it with US data. It quantitatively characterizes
the optimal tax and monitoring policy. Let us emphasize some of these results.
Compared to the utilitarian optimum, the non-inclusion of the disutility terms−δ
a
into the non-
welfarist criterion always implies more able workers at the optimum and this drives the following
results. Compared to the utilitarian optimum, the non-welfarist optimum is always characterized
by (i) a higher welfare level, (ii) a lower stigma level and (iii) a lower probability of type II error.
Simulations highlight situations where no monitoring is optimal. Under a utilitarian criterion,
there always exists a level of exogenous resources R beyond which monitoring becomes suboptimal
(i.e. µ = 1). Since the disutility terms δ
a
reduces the social welfare level, it is optimal that more
and more able workers stop working when R increases. When the economy has high exogenous
resources, monitoring becomes suboptimal (no more able with δ
a
>
˜
δ
a
work), as illustrated in
Figure 1. Contrarily, monitoring is always optimal (µ < 1) under the non-welfarist criterion,
whatever R. Intuitively, able people who stop working reduce efficiency without improving equity
under that criterion.
When the marginal disutility of stigma s (with σ
′
(
π
NW
a
)
< 0) increases, the welfare levels
under both criteria continuously decrease. Monitoring is used more intensively, and therefore type
II errors decrease with s.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has assumed an economy where lazy able people may pretend to be disabled and where
some disabled people may not takeup disability benefits designed for them. It has been shown that
modeling the monitoring technology and the participation decisions, i.e. participation to the labor
market and to disability programs, is critical to design the optimal tax schedule. Formulas for the
optimal taxation and optimal monitoring accuracy have been provided where the mechanical and
behavioral effects are highlighted.
This paper has introduced an endogenous takeup cost in an optimal tax framework. It has
emphasized that the qualitative nature of the optimal policy is not affected by this takeup cost.
Relaxing the usual (and unrealistic) assumption that disabled people do not work, it has been
shown that disabled recipients get a strictly lower consumption than disabled workers.
Conditions under which the optimal transfer program is a Negative Income Tax or an Earned
Income Tax Credit have been stated. Since it is novel to consider and to endogenize monitoring,
these conditions differ from the usual ones in the optimal income tax literature. In particular,
with costly monitoring, a marginal social welfare weight on disabled workers lower than one is
not sufficient for advocating a Negative Income Tax. Moreover, this paper has shown that when
monitoring is costless, perfect monitoring is not optimal. In other words, some cheating is always
optimal. The quantitative sensitivity of the optimal program to a non-welfarist criterion (which
does not compensate for distaste for work) versus a utilitarian criterion has been emphasized
through simulations.
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Appendix
A Proof of the optimum’s properties under full-information
The Lagrangian can be stated as
£ = N
d
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
d
) (v (x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
))− δ
d
) + (1− ℓ (δ
d
)) v (x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
))]dF(δ
d
)
]
+N
a
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
a
) v (x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
)) + (1− ℓ (δ
a
)) v (x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
))]dG(δ
α
)
]
+λ
{
N
d
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
d
) (w
L
− x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
))− (1− ℓ (δ
d
)) x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
)]dF(δ
d
)
]
+ N
a
[
∫
∞
0
[ℓ (δ
a
) (w
H
− x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
))− (1− ℓ (δ
a
)) x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
)] dG(δ
a
)
]
−R
}
where λ is the (non-negative) Lagrangian multiplier associated to the budget constraint. For any
pair (δ
d
, δ
a
), the first-order conditions with respect to the four consumption functions are:
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
)
[
v
′
(x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
))− λ
]
dF(δ
d
) = 0
∫
∞
0
(1− ℓ (δ
d
))
[
v
′
(x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
))− λ
]
dF (δ
d
) = 0
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
a
)
[
v
′
(x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
))− λ
]
dG(δ
a
) = 0
∫
∞
0
(1− ℓ (δ
a
))
[
v
′
(x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
))− λ
]
dG(δ
a
) = 0
Hence we get the following four conditions, for any pair (δ
d
, δ
a
):
ℓ (δ
d
)
[
v
′
(x
ℓ
(δ
d
, w
L
))− λ
]
= 0
(1− ℓ (δ
d
))
[
v
′
(x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
))− λ
]
= 0
ℓ (δ
a
)
[
v
′
(x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
))− λ
]
= 0
(1− ℓ (δ
a
))
[
v
′
(x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
))− λ
]
= 0
But since ℓ (δ
k
) (k = d, a) are equal to 1 or 0, only two of them matter. For those that matter
the corresponding marginal utilities of consumption have to be equal. For the other two, the
consumption functions do not matter (as nobody with this value for δ
k
is receiving it). Therefore,
since λ is a constant, we have that the first-order conditions with respect to consumption reduce
to ∀ (δ
d
, δ
a
):
v
′
(x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
)) = v
′
(x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
)) = v
′
(x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
)) = v
′
(x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
)) = λ
⇐⇒ x = x
l
(δ
d
, w
L
) = x
b
(δ
d
, w
L
) = x
h
(δ
a
, w
H
) = x
b
(δ
a
, w
H
) (24)
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From (24), the tax transfer towards the disabled workers, x−w
L
, is lower than the transfer to
the inactive disabled, x. A NIT is optimal.
From the budget constraint, we have
x = N
d
w
L
∫
∞
0
ℓ (d
δ
)dF (d
δ
) +N
a
w
H
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
a
) dG (δ
a
) +R (25)
x only depends on the number of disabled and the number of able agents who are employed.
Consequently, the value of our objective function becomes
v
(
N
d
w
L
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
)dF (δ
d
) +N
a
w
H
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
a
)dG (δ
α
) +R
)
−N
d
∫
∞
0
ℓ (δ
d
) δ
d
dF (δ
d
)
The value of our objective function is maximal when all able agents work: ℓ (δ
a
) = 1 ∀δ
a
. Therefore,
from the budget constraint we have x = N
d
w
L
∫
∞
0
ℓ (d
δ
)dF(d
δ
) +N
a
w
H
+R . Further, as δ
d
rises
from 0 to∞ the function ℓ (δ
d
) δ
d
, where ℓ (δ
d
) = 1 ∀δ
d
, goes from 0 to∞. Hence, among disabled,
it will always be optimal to have those in work with the lowest δ
d
. Consequently, the function
ℓ (δ
d
) will have the following shape: ℓ (δ
d
) = 1 for all δ
d
≤
̂
δ
d
and ℓ (δ
d
) = 0 otherwise. The critical
value is determined by
v
′
(x)N
d
w
L
f
(
̂
δ
d
)
−N
d
̂
δ
d
f
(
̂
δ
d
)
= 0
⇔
̂
δ
d
= v
′
(x)w
L
> 0
̂
δ
d
is such that the net loss of utility when the marginal disabled individuals are shifted from the
disability assistance to the unskilled job is equal to the gain of resources (w
L
) valued according to
their common marginal utility. Since v
′
(x) and w
L
are finite,
̂
δ
d
<∞. It implies that it is optimal
for some disabled individuals not to work.
B Proof that x
h
≥ x
l
under asymmetric information
By contradiction, suppose x
h
< x
l
. All able individuals who work choose to produce w
L
units and
receive net income x
l
. From (1) and (2), nobody get x
h
as consumption bundle. Then, keeping x
l
fixed, we can assume dx
h
> 0 such that x
h
+ dx
h
= x
l
. Now able people who work produce w
H
units and get x
h
as consumption bundle. Increasing the level of x
h
up to x
l
does not require any
additional consumption since x
h
+ dx
h
− x
l
= 0 and since
˜
δ
a
and the number of able people who
work is unchanged. The number of able people who apply for and take up benefits is then also
unchanged. Hence from (2),
˜
δ
d
and the number of disabled taking up assistance do not change as
well. Yet, all able workers now choose skilled jobs and earn w
H
(> w
L
). Since the cost in terms of
supplementary consumption is zero and the difference w
H
− w
L
is strictly positive, a net receipt
appears: w
H
− w
L
> 0. The fiscal pie increases and more redistribution can occur. This will
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indubitably increase welfare. Therefore, it cannot be optimal for the government to let x
l
> x
h
,
and, thus, consumption when producing more units must be larger: x
h
≥ x
l
.
This implies that only disabled people work in unskilled jobs at the optimum. Therefore they
are perfectly tagged as disabled. However being recognized as disabled is not a characteristic that
implies stigma, contrarily.
C Economics behind the first-order condition with respect to x
b
A small change dx
b
> 0 implies mechanical and behavioral effects on government revenue and
welfare.
Mechanical effect
There is a mechanical decrease in tax revenue equal to −
(
π
NW
a
+ π
NW
d
)
dx
b
because recipi-
ents receive extra benefit dx
b
. This mechanical decrease in tax revenue, however, is valued
(
π
NW
a
+ π
NW
d
)
(v
′
(x
b
)/λ− 1)dx
b
by the government since the consumption gain dx
b
is socially
valued v
′
(x
b
)/λ in terms of public funds.
Behavioral effect
There are two effects on government revenue due to behavioral responses.
(1) The change dx
b
induces ∂π
W
a
/∂x
b
able recipients to leave the labor force. Each able agent
leaving the labor force induces a loss in tax revenue of w
H
−x
h
+x
b
, i.e. the tax she paid (w
H
−x
h
)
and the benefit that she now receives. There is also a loss in monitoring expenditures (M(µ))
for the additional ∂
(
N
a
G
(
˜
δ
a
))
/∂x
b
able people who apply for disability benefits. The loss of
government expenditures is then (w
H
− x
h
+ x
b
+M(µ)/µ)
(
∂π
W
a
/∂x
b
)
dx
b
. dx
b
> 0 also induces
a welfare loss due to the reduction of workers (∂π
W
a
/∂x
b
< 0) whose disutility
˜
δ
a
was not valued into
the non-welfarist criterion. This welfare loss expressed in public funds is
(
˜
δ
a
/λ
)
(
∂π
W
a
/∂x
b
)
dx
b
.
(2) The change dx
b
induces ∂π
W
d
/∂x
b
disabled workers to leave the labor force (through direct
effect and indirect stigma effect). Each disabled agent leaving the labor force induces a government
revenue loss of w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ). Hence the loss is (w
L
− x
l
+ x
b
+M(µ))
(
∂π
W
d
/∂x
b
)
dx
b
.
The change dx
b
also affects welfare through a change in the stigma intensity of the π
NW
d
dis-
abled recipients. This change in terms of public funds is valued −π
NW
d
(∂σ/∂x
b
/λ)dx
b
by the
government.
The sum of all these effects equal zero at the optimum. This gives (17), the first-order condition
with respect to x
b
.
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D Simulations
Combining constraints (1), (2), (6) and the non-welfarist criterion, it is convenient to rewrite the
problem as:
W
1
(
˜
δ
d
,
˜
δ
a
, µ, x
b
)
≡ N
d
[
˜
δ
d
F (
˜
δ
d
)− σ
(
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
−
∫
˜
δ
d
0
δ
d
dF(δ
d
)
]
+
+
[
N
a
(
(1− µ) +G
(
˜
δ
a
))]
˜
δ
a
+ v(x
b
) (26)
with
x
b
(
˜
δ
d
,
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
=
π
W
d
w
L
+ π
W
a
w
H
−
(
π
NW
d
+
π
NW
a
µ
)
M(µ) +R
π
W
d
e
˜
δ
d
−σ
(
˜
δ
a
,µ
)
+
(
π
NW
d
+ π
NW
a
)
+ π
W
a
e
˜
δ
a
where a logarithmic utility function u(.) ≡ ln(.) and equations (1), (2) have been used. Therefore,
the problem becomes a three dimensional problem
(
˜
δ
d
,
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
. In the same vein, the constrained
maximization of the utilitarian criterion can easily be rewritten as a three dimensional problem.
The subjacent system of first-order conditions is highly nonlinear and too complex to be stud-
ied analytically. Therefore, since multiple local optima may exist, for each vector of parameters
(s,R,w
L
, w
H
,N
d
) and for some specific distribution functions F(δ
d
), G(δ
a
) and monitoring func-
tion M(µ), the objective function (26) is evaluated for a wide range of values of the endogenous
variables
(
˜
δ
d
,
˜
δ
a
, µ
)
. Through this numerical method, we check whether the solution found is the
global optimum.
Calibration
There is no empirical evidence concerning the disutility of work due to disability or aversion to
work. Therefore, δ
d
and δ
a
are distributed according to Gamma distributions since the latter take
a very large variety of shapes by perturbing only its r parameter.
20
Let r
δ
d
, r
δ
a
be the parameters
characterizing Gamma distributions respectively for δ
d
and δ
a
. In 1998, almost 20% of people
in the US report some level of disability (Stoddard et al., 1998). In 2001, almost 15% of the
population of working age from EU countries report severe and moderate disability (Eurostat,
2001). Following Benitez-Silva et al. (2004a) who show that the hypothesis that self-reported
disability is an unbiased indicator that cannot be rejected, N
d
= 0.15. Here, with two levels of
skills, assumptions about w
H
and w
L
can hardly be based on actual wage distributions. As a
benchmark, the base setting for parameters is
w
L
= 50, w
H
= 100, R = 0, s = 3, r
δ
d
= 5 and r
δ
a
= 1
20
The density of a Gamma is given by:
f(x) =
1
Γ(r)
exp(−x)x
r−1
where Γ(r) is a Gamma law of parameter and the later is equal to the mean and the variance of the distribution. We
have checked that our conclusions are maintained with other continuous distributions defined on the infinite support
[0,+∞).
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A sensitivity analysis on s will be conducted later. We consider R strictly larger than −[N
d
w
H
+
N
a
w
L
] = −92.5 otherwise the budget constraint (6) is violated. The specification of the monitoring
function is
M(µ) =m(1/µ− 1) with m > 0 (27)
The value of m is given by (27) where µ and M(µ) are replaced by empirical estimates as follows.
Benitez-Silva et al. (2004b) estimate that approximately 20% of applicants who are ultimately
awarded benefits are not disabled hence µ = 0.2. The (average) monthly disability benefit is
$786 and is about the (average) labor earnings of disabled people w
L
(however the variance is
large) (Benitez-Silva et al., 2004b). The average cost of running Social Security Administration
(Disability Insurance) bureaucracy, which determines eligibility for disability benefits, is about
$2000 per application in the U.S. (Benitez-Silva et al., 2004b). The claims are typically reviewed
every year. Hence, the monthly average per capita cost of monitoring is $166.7. Therefore,
w
L
= 4.7M. Since w
L
= 50, M = 10.6. M ∈ [7.5; 15] is considered to get a range of empirically
relevant parameters. Substituting µ = 0.2 and M ∈ [7.5; 15] into (27) gives a large interval of
plausible values for m: m ∈ [1.8; 3.8]. Finally, when m needs to be fixed, m = 2 is taken.
When monitoring is suboptimal
Our simulations give the threshold values of m, the parameter of the per capita monitoring cost
in (27) beyond which monitoring is suboptimal (i.e. µ = 1) as expected in Section 4. With the
non-welfarist criterion, monitoring is suboptimal when m ≥ 73. With the utilitarian criterion,
monitoring is suboptimal when m ≥ 50.3. Under both criteria, the threshold value beyond which
monitoring is suboptimal is large relative to labor earnings in low-productivity jobs (w
ℓ
= 50) or
relative to (per capita) governmental exogenous resources (R = 0). These thresholds also seem
unrealistically high compared to the interval of empirically plausible values, 1.8 ≤m ≤ 3.8.
Another situation where monitoring is suboptimal which cannot be grasped by the first-order
conditions analysis, but through simulations is the following. Under the utilitarian criterion, when
the exogenous resources R become very high (and larger than m and w
h
according to all our
simulations), monitoring becomes suboptimal (µ = 1). With our previous calibrations, monitoring
becomes suboptimal when R ≥ 130.96 under the utilitarian criterion, as shown in Figure 1. For
R ≥ 130.96, monitoring stops being used and no more able people with δ
a
>
˜
δ
a
work. The
proportion of able workers, π
W
a
, then sharply shrinks. At R = 130.96, there is a discontinuity in
the probability of type II errors µ which jumps up to 1. The proportion of able workers then has
also a discontinuity at R = 130.96 (see Figure 1).
Under the criterion which does not compensate for distaste for work, our simulations do not
report a threshold R beyond which monitoring is suboptimal, given the previously chosen parame-
ters. Intuitively, able people who stop working reduce efficiency without improving equity under
the non-welfarist criterion. Therefore, under this criterion, the proportion of able people who
work, π
W
a
, is stable (see Figure 1) with R. Financial incentives and monitoring (hence tagging)
both are used to maintained π
W
a
high and stable.
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Comparison of the optima under the non-welfarist and the utilitarian criteria
The non-welfarist criterion always allows to reach a higher welfare level than the utilitarian criterion
and a lower stigma level. According to simulations, any non-welfarist optimum always gives
incentives to or enforce more able people to work (the probability of type II errors is lower) than
the utilitarian optimum.
The results of simulations do not allow to give general rankings of the optimal x
j
(j = l, h, b)
under the utilitarian SWF compared to the same consumption bundle under the non-welfarist
criterion. For example, in Figure 2, when m < 37, the optimal level of x
l
under the utilitarian
criterion is below the optimal level of x
l
under the non-welfarist criterion. When m ≥ 37, this
ranking is reversed.
Sensitivity analysis
The non-welfarist and utilitarian social welfare levels are continuous and decreasing in the para-
meter of the per capita cost of monitoring (m) and increasing in the exogenous resources (R).
Increasing the cost parameter a in the range where monitoring is suboptimal (i.e., m ≥ 50.3 under
the utilitarian criterion and m ≥ 73 under the non-welfarist criterion) has no more impact on the
optimal variables, see Figure 2. Stigma is not monotonous neither with m nor with R. The prob-
ability of type II error (µ) continuously increases with the cost parameter m (up to µ = 1). Under
the non-welfarist criterion, consumption bundles have discontinuities at m = 73, i.e. when mon-
itoring becomes suboptimal (see Figure 2). Under the utilitarian criterion, consumption bundles
are continuous with m.
When the exogenous resources increase, we already know that the proportion of able workers
never increases. And the proportion of disabled workers, π
W
d
, decreases under both criteria. When
R > 120, π
W
d
decreases below 0.001 under both criteria.
When the marginal disutility of stigma s increases, the welfare levels under both criteria contin-
uously decrease. The effect of s on the optimum stigma level σ(.) level is always positive for small
s and may become negative for larger values. Monitoring is used more intensively, and therefore
type II errors decrease with s. With our calibrations, under the utilitarian criterion, as long as
s < 14.7, inequality (5) is satisfied hence ∂
˜
δ
d
/∂x
b
< 0 is guaranteed. Under the non-welfarist
criterion, s < 15.2 guarantees ∂
˜
δ
d
/∂x
b
< 0.
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Under Non-Welfarist SWF
Under Utilitarian SWF
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Figure 1: Under the utilitarian SWF, the probability of type II error, µ, increases and the pro-
portion of able workers, π
W
a
, decreases, with exogenous resources, R. Under the non-welfarist
criterion, µ decreases with R and π
W
a
is maintained stable. Under the utilitarian SWF, tagging is
suboptimal (µ = 1) when R ≥ 130.96.
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Figure 2: Consumption levels under the utilitarian and the non-welfarist criteria as functions of
m, the magnitude of the per capita cost of monitoring. Monitoring is suboptimal and consumption
bundles constant when m ≥ 73 under the non-welfarist criterion, and when m ≥ 50.3 under the
utilitarian criterion.
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